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A STORY OF A BIRTH AND A FUNERAL:
A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF WINDSOR AND
SHELBY COUNTY
Min Kyung Lee*
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided two major cases—United
States v. Windsor and Shelby County v. Holder. The Court’s
rulings prompted inquiries and criticisms regarding how the Court
could simultaneously signal the birth of marriage equality and
mark the end of racial equality. This Article compares these two
cases by introducing another dimension that may make them more
harmonious than they appear. In particular, it focuses on the
Court’s narrative framework in each case and conducts a
rhetorical analysis to analyze these narrative frameworks. It
argues that the Court employs a personal narrative in Windsor
and an institutional narrative in Shelby County, yet it
conceptualizes and focuses on a “right” in each case.
Additionally, the Court’s use of a personal narrative in Windsor
and an institutional narrative in Shelby County increases the
persuasiveness of the opinions.

* J.D., Columbia Law School, 2014; Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar; Parker School
Certificate recipient. I would like to thank Professor Katherine Franke for
guidance on this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2013 was a critical time for the Supreme Court
of the United States. During that time, the Court decided two major
cases: United States v. Windsor1 and Shelby County v. Holder.2 Its
rulings in these cases perplexed many civil rights activists and
legal scholars because the decisions seemed at odds on the issue of
equality: many viewed Windsor as a step forward in achieving
marriage equality 3 and Shelby County as a retreat in racial
equality. 4 Questions arose as to the Court’s apparent
inconsistency. 5 Some scholars analyzed these questions in the
context of social movements. Is the LGBT movement a new racial
movement?6 Are we living in the world of post-racialism?7 Do we
1

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
3
See, e.g., John D. Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free Exercise,
Speech, and Association, 99 M INN . L. R EV . 485 (2014); Douglas NeJaime,
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 Y ALE L.J. O NLINE 219, 221–23 (2013),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/2013/9/15/nejaime.html.
4
See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Shelby Co. v. Holder: The Crippling of the
Voting Rights Act, AM. CONSTITUTION SOCIETY BLOG (June 27, 2013),
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/shelby-co-v-holder-the-crippling-of-the-votingrights-act (stating that “relying on the myth of racial progress, the Supreme
Court failed to confront the racial balkanization in voting that exists”); Tanya
Hernandez, A Watered-Down Vision of Equality, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/06/26/is-the-civil-rights-eraover/a-watered-down-vision-of-equality (“One can celebrate the victories for
gay people . . . while at the same time decrying the decisions’ limited vision of
equality. That limited vision eroded the pursuit of equality in this term’s racial
justice cases.”).
5
See, e.g., Enumale Agada & Aaron Blacksberg, A Tale of Two Cases:
Shelby County v. Holder and United States v. Windsor, HARV. AM.
CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www3.law.harvard.edu/
orgs/acs/2013/11/02/a-tale-of-two-cases-shelby-county-v-holder-and-unitedstates-v-windsor/ (describing a talk by Professor Pam Karlan, wherein she
compared the two cases).
6
See, e.g., Paul Butler, The Court Should Focus on Justice Rather
Than Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/
roomfordebate/2013/06/26/is-the-civil-rights-era-over/the-court-should-focuson-justice-rather-than-rights.
7
See, e.g., Atiba R. Ellis, Mission Accomplished? Post-Racialism in Shelby
2
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no longer feel the need to focus on racial equality but feel the
stronger need to address marriage inequality? The focal point of
these inquiries was the inconsistent outcomes of these two cases:
one that signaled an advance of civil rights while the other signaled
a retreat.
This Article attempts to shift the focus from the outcome of the
cases to the processes by which they were decided: it analyzes how
they were decided rather than what the outcomes were. It argues
that by analyzing the content of the decisions, one might find them
more harmonious than what their starkly different outcomes might
suggest. It further argues that this mode of analysis reveals two
similarities that are not easily apparent from looking at the
outcomes. First, both cases evoke a similar rhetoric regarding the
concept of rights. While one case is a discussion of individual
rights and the other of institutional rights, the Court engages in an
extensive discussion of the particular right in each case. The
rhetoric suggests that the Court is not necessarily pro-right in
Windsor and anti-right in Shelby County. Instead, it suggests that
the Court conceptualizes the subject of rights differently in each
case: rights of individuals in Windsor and rights of institutions, like
states, in Shelby County. Second, to advance these
conceptualizations of rights, the Court in both cases uses rhetorical
devices that make the outcomes more persuasive.
In describing how the Court convincingly conceptualizes rights
in both cases, this Article uses the terms personal narrative and
institutional narrative. As used in this Article, personal narrative is
storytelling that focuses on developing personal characters and
triggering emotional attachment to those characters and their
stories. In contrast, institutional narrative focuses on reducing this
personal connection between individual characters and the reader.
An institutional narrative seeks to gain legitimacy and
persuasiveness by focusing on an institution, such as the federal
government, including its traditions and principles. This Article
explores the effects of the Court’s framing of these two
County, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.acslaw.
org/acsblog/mission-accomplished-post-racialism-and-shelby-county for postracialism discussion.
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narratives—it does not express a normative argument for either
one.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
conventional reception of Windsor and Shelby County. It explores
how scholars have attempted to compare, analyze, and understand
these cases in relation to their outcomes. Part II describes the
methodology of rhetorical analysis. Part III uses rhetorical analysis
to explore the personal narrative presented in Windsor. Part IV
uses rhetorical analysis to explore the Court’s institutional
narrative in Shelby County. This Article concludes with a
comparative discussion of the two cases and highlights the
similarities that have been largely overlooked.
I. RECEPTION OF WINDSOR AND SHELBY COUNTY
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Shelby County
caused significant consternation among civil rights activists and
legal scholars. This is unsurprising—a focus solely on the
outcomes makes the rulings seem at odds.
Scholars and practitioners generally view Windsor as a step
forward in achieving marriage equality. For example, some
scholars have described Windsor as “a landmark victory for gay
rights”8 that “did much to advance the cause of same sex-marriage
when it held that the United States should follow the lead of the
various states in deciding on whether to accept same-sex
marriage.”9 Another scholar described it as a “Supreme Court term
[that brought] important progress on [the same-sex marriage]
front.”10
At the same time, many criticized Shelby County as a retreat in
racial equality. One critic spoke of the decision: “relying on the
myth of racial progress, the Supreme Court failed to confront the
8

Inazu, supra note 3, at 521.
Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: The Unfinished Business of the Supreme
Court-an Introduction, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & L IBERTY 137, 138–39 (2013) (citing
William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage after Windsor, 8
N.Y.U. J.L. & L IBERTY 150, 159 (2013)).
10
Adam Lioz, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: How the Supreme Court Helped
Create the Inequality Era and Why a New Jurisprudence Must Lead Us Out, 43
S ETON H ALL L. R EV . 1227, 1281 (2013).
9
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racial balkanization in voting that exists.”11 Some scholars went so
far to say it “marks the end of the civil rights era.”12 Reacting to
the holding, Adam Lioz declared: “our generation must carry
forward the torch of racial equality,” and hinted that Shelby County
created room for more improvement in racial equality.13
Many perplexed scholars focused on these inconsistent
outcomes. Some asked how “[o]ne can celebrate the victories of
gay people . . . while at the same time decrying the decisions’
limited vision of equality. That limited vision eroded the pursuit of
equality in this term’s racial justice cases.” 14 Various scholars
focused on this inconsistency through multiple angles, but these
analyses shared a commonality: they all focused on the outcomes.
For example, many scholars approached the cases in the context of
social movements. For example, some noted that Windsor forms a
parallel with the growing support of gay movements in society,
while Shelby County is congruent with the recent discussion of a
post-racial society. Some argued that while the Supreme Court’s
decision in Windsor coincides with the growing support for gay
rights, 15 the “[e]xisting social realities belie the claim that the
antidiscrimination norm has achieved unqualified success for
African-Americans or that we have reached a ‘post’ racial
society.”16 A similar analysis contrasts Windsor and the growing
support for gay rights with Shelby County by stating, “one needs to
look no further than the recent Shelby County v. Holder” decision
to see some evidence to the contrary.17 Again, these analyses focus
solely on outcomes—Windsor’s invalidation of the Defense of
11

Ellis, supra note 7.
Inazu, supra note 3, at 518 n.168.
13
Lioz, supra note 10, at 1281 n.257.
14
Hernandez, supra note 4 (“One can celebrate the victories for gay people
while at the same time decrying this term’s sadly limited vision of justice for
all.”).
15
Inazu, supra note 3, at 519–20.
16
Id. at 518. See also, e.g., Mario L. Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal
Protection?, 98 G EO . L.J. 967, 972 (2010); Inazu, supra note 3, at 517–20, 534
n.168; Butler, supra note 6; Ellis, supra note 7.
17
Jane S. Schacter, Unequal Inequalities? Poverty, Sexual Orientation, and
the Dynamics of Constitutional Law, 2014 U TAH L. R EV . 867, 881–82 (2014).
12
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Marriage Act (“DOMA”), and Shelby County’s invalidation of the
Voting Rights Act.
This Article does not analyze the wisdom of this scholarship.
Instead, it attempts to supplement this comparative exercise by
shifting the focus from the cases’ outcomes to the processes by
which they were decided. It examines how the Court narrated the
points at issue and the choice of language in the opinions. It argues
that a focus on how the cases were examined—rather than simply
their holdings—reveals similarities that may not otherwise be
apparent: most importantly, the persuasive narration of the concept
of “rights.”
II. METHODOLOGY: RHETORIC AS A MEANS OF PERSUASION
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Windsor and Shelby County
display two consistencies: first, the Court in both cases presents an
extensive discourse of the concept of the “right” at issue, and
second, the Court uses various rhetorical devices to convince the
readers of its conceptualization of these rights, and thus, the
outcomes of the cases. In so arguing, this Article conducts a
rhetorical analysis of both Windsor and Shelby County.
Rhetorical analysis “looks at how the law works by exploring a
meaning-making process, one in which the law is ‘constituted’ as
human beings located within particular historical and cultural
communities write, read, argue about, and decide legal issues.”18
Many scholars who conduct rhetorical analyses focus on how the
Supreme Court uses rhetorical devices as a means of persuasion
and these scholars define rhetoric as a “written discourse . . . [or]
other [type] of symbolic communicative activity used to alter
attitudes and mobilize action or to induce cooperation.”19 This
definition of rhetoric is consistent with the Aristotelian tradition,
which views rhetoric as “a faculty of considering all the possible
means of persuasion on every subject.”20
18

Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching “Law as Rhetoric:” A Place to
Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3, 5 (2010).
19
Prentice, supra note 19, at 87 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
20
ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE’S TREATISE ON RHETORIC, BOOK 1, 11 (Theodore
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According to Charles Miller, the Supreme Court has two major
roles: “(1) to enunciate a political legal order through formal
adjudication, and (2) to preserve the social-political bonds of the
country.” 21 To serve its second role, the Court must convince
readers that its decisions are “reasonable, if not right.” 22
Sometimes, however, logic is not enough to persuade readers:
“[E]ven if people are unable to find any flaw in the logical chain
leading from an agreed-upon premise to a desired conclusion, they
can, and regularly do, simply choose to remain unpersuaded.”23
Therefore, to persuade the reader, the Court has to persuasde
“through the medium of ordinary language” in addition to its sound
legal argument. 24 This medium of ordinary language includes
rhetorical strategies like “emotional appeals, symbolism, audience
adaptation, and other persuasive techniques . . . .”25
The narrative structure of cases is important because “[l]aw is
now widely recognized as one of those places where narrative
finds a home.”26 Law does not exist in a vacuum. It forms an
integral part of society, as “no set of legal institutions or
prescriptions exist apart from the narratives that locate it and give
it meaning.” 27 Therefore, when we understand law within the
context of narratives, “law becomes not merely a system of rules to
be observed but a world in which we live.”28 In other words, a
study of the Supreme Court’s narrative shows how the Court,
through storytelling, attempts to build a bridge between its legal

Buckley
trans.
London,
Bohn
1857),
available
at
https://books.google.com/books?id=PIIUAAAAcAAJ.
21
C HARLES A. M ILLER, T HE S UPREME C OURT AND THE U SES OF
H ISTORY 189 (1969).
22
Austin Sarat, Rhetoric and Remembrance: Trials, Transcription, and the
Politics of Critical Reading, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 355, 371 (1999).
23
Sherman J. Clark, The Character of Persuasion, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV.
61, 64 (2003).
24
ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, at 8.
25
Prentice, supra note 19, at 89.
26
Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 355 (1996).
27
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term Forward: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
28
Id. at 5.
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arguments and the reader’s world. Since stories can “create
emotional responses . . . narratives then[] appear to be uniquely
suited to changing opinions and beliefs which are held
emotionally, and which may be resistant to other forms of
persuasion.”29 This Article, using narrative as a methodological
tool, examines the stories presented in the two cases and how the
facts and evidence are framed to contribute to the respective
narratives. This analysis reveals coherency in the Supreme Court’s
employment of the two frameworks and its narratives within them.
III. THE PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF WINDSOR
A. Introduction to Windsor
United States. v. Windsor is a landmark decision in which the
Supreme Court struck down DOMA. The plaintiff, Edith Windsor,
was the surviving spouse of Thea Spyer.30 The two were married in
Canada, where same-sex marriage was legal.31 New York, where
the couple resided, did not allow same sex marriage at the time but
recognized their Canadian marriage. 32 However, Windsor was
denied the benefit of spousal deduction in federal estate taxes.33
This denial was because the federal law, DOMA, did not recognize
same-sex marriage under its definition of “marriage,” nor did it
recognize a same-sex partner as a “spouse.”34 It defined “marriage”
as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”35 After Windsor paid
taxes, she brought an action for a federal tax refund and to declare
the relevant portion of DOMA as violative of the Fifth

29

Philip J. Mazzocco & Melanie C. Green, Narrative Persuasion in Legal
Settings: What’s the Story?, 23 JURY EXPERT 27, 28 (2011).
30
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
31
Id.
32
Id. at 2689.
33
Id. at 2683.
34
Id.
35
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (DOMA § 3), held unconstitutional in Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675.
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Amendment.36 The Department of Justice refused to defend the
statute, but the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) of the
House of Representatives intervened in the litigation to defend
DOMA’s constitutionality.37
The Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit
ruled that the portion of DOMA that excluded same-sex partners
from the definition of “spouse” was unconstitutional and ordered
the United States to pay a refund to Windsor.38 The Supreme Court
affirmed the Second Circuit.39 In its decision, the Court ruled that
DOMA and its definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” violated the
Fifth Amendment, as they denied homosexual couples the liberty
and equal protection granted by the Due Process Clause,40 because
Section 3 of the statute limited marriage to heterosexual couples.41
B. Possibility of Alternate Framing
Windsor is about both an individual and an institution. On the
one hand, it is the story of Edith Windsor and her loving, same-sex
marriage.42 On the other hand, it is about institutional power and
the conflict between federal and state institutions and their ability
to define marriage.
The parties presented the Court with these alternative framings.
The complaint filed in the Southern District centered on “Edie and

36

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
Id.
38
Id. at 2683–84.
39
Id. at 2696.
40
Id. at 2683.
41
See id. (quoting § 3 of DOMA as having provided: “In determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of
the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite
sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
42
See generally Complaint, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:10CV08435); see also Video: Edie and Thea (ACLU
2013) (telling through interviews the love affair of Edie Windsor and Thea
Spyer), available at https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/edie-windsor-and-acluchallenge-defense-marriage-act.
37
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Thea’s life stories.”43 The facts section begins: “Edie and Thea’s
life stories are in one sense remarkable for the extraordinary times
through which they lived, and at the same time quite typical of the
lives of gay men and lesbians of their generations . . . .”44 This
rhetorical strategy to establish an empathetic personal character
reaches its peak when the complaint states that “Edie and Thea
went on to live lives of great joy, full of dancing, love, and
celebration.”45 The facts section adds further depth regarding the
couple’s lives. These sections provide seemingly extraneous but
moving details, such as “Thea was fortunate enough to be able to
flee Amsterdam with her stepmother at the outbreak of the Second
World War, thereby escaping the Holocaust.” 46 The complaint
ultimately devotes four pages to Edie and Thea’s love story47 and
only a single page to DOMA.48
In Windsor’s motion for summary judgment, this personal
narrative is also prevalent. The word “Edie” appears forty-three
times, “Edith” three times, and “Windsor” seven times. 49 The
preliminary statement of this memorandum similarly starts with the
story of Edie and Thea.50 The factual background in Windsor’s
brief to the Supreme Court also begins with how Windsor and
Spyer “fell in love and embarked upon a relationship that would
last until Dr. Spyer’s death forty-four years later.”51 Their love
story continues until page five of the brief.52 The word “Windsor”
appears thirty-nine times.53
43

See generally Complaint, supra note 43.
Id. para. 13.
45
Id.
46
Id. para. 14.
47
Id. paras. 20–51.
48
See id. paras. 60–69.
49
See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No.
1:10CV08435), 2011 WL 3165327.
50
Id. at 1.
51
Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 1, United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief on the
Merits for Respondent Windsor], 2013 WL 701228.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Id. passim.
44
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In contrast, BLAG’s brief frames the issue with detachment
and abstraction, and focuses on institutional process and power.54
The trial court brief begins by stating that “when people disagree
in the legislative process, they often are required to listen to each
other so as to be able to rebut arguments actually made by
opponents and change enough minds to bring about legislative
change.”55 It is not the story of Edie and Thea that introduces the
case. Rather, the legislative process and its integrity begin the
story.56 Further, BLAG’s brief refers to Windsor with impersonal
nouns. The word “plaintiff” appears fifty-four times but “Edie” and
“Windsor” only once each (in fact, “Edie Windsor” was the only
time these two words appeared).57
The treatment of DOMA also differs. Windsor’s Supreme
Court brief starts by framing the Act’s personal implications: “this
case raises questions whether Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage
Act, which excludes legally married couples who are gay from the
federal rights, benefits, and burdens that govern all other married
couples, is constitutional.” 58 The implications of DOMA are
immediately linked with “married couples who are gay.”59 On the
other hand, the BLAG Supreme Court brief begins with DOMA
and how “every state and the federal government define
marriage.” 60 Its discussion of DOMA starts with the issue of
Congressional power and authority, not with DOMA’s
implications for gay and lesbian couples: “DOMA reflected
Congress’ determination that each sovereign should be able to
determine for itself how to define marriage for purposes of its own
law.”61
54

See Reply Memorandum of Law for Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group at
1, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (No. 10-CV8435), 2011 WL 4428691.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 11.
58
Brief on the Merits for Respondent Windsor, supra note 52, at 1.
59
Id.
60
Brief on the Merits for Respondent Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the U.S. House of Representatives at 2, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
61
Id. at 3–4.
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As the court documents demonstrate, there were two possible
alternatives for conceptualizing the case: one deploying rhetoric
that emphasizes the Act’s consequences to people such as Edith
Windsor, and another focusing more abstractly on DOMA and
highlighting the legislative, sovereign powers of Congress. In the
face of these alternatives, this Article argues that the Court in
Windsor adopted a personal narrative that illuminated the strategic
narration of an individual right.
C. Rhetoric on Rights: Rights of Individuals
Since Windsor posed a Fifth Amendment challenge to DOMA,
most observers expected that the Court would at least engage in a
discussion of individual rights, such as the right to due process and
equality. The significant aspect of this case, and the subject of this
Article, is how the Court conducts its discussion of individual
rights.
First, the Supreme Court created a protagonist, Edith Windsor,
to reinforce its rhetoric on her individual right. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion opens with a story of Windsor and her partner,
Thea Spyer. 62 “Two women then resident in New York were
married in a lawful ceremony in Ontario, Canada, in 2007.”63 This
opening introduces the protagonist, Windsor, and her partner. This
immediately frames the case as a story of a personal character.64
This sentence also immediately gives detailed information on
Windsor. First, she was once a resident in New York, second,
married in Ontario, third, she was married to another woman, and
fourth, she married in 2007.65 Contrast this framing to that of the
dissents. Chief Justice Roberts began his dissent with a
jurisdictional question and placed a legal issue at the forefront.66
Similarly, Justice Scalia started his dissent with the notion that
“this case is about power in several respects,” and he framed the

62
63
64
65
66

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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case in relation to an abstract concept of power.67 The second
sentence of Justice Kennedy’s opinion continues his personal
narrative of the story of the two women: “Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer returned to their home in New York City.”68
Throughout the opening paragraph, Justice Kennedy kept
constant this narrative about the two women. The second sentence
tells the reader her name and the name of her spouse.69 Other
sentences in the first paragraph also begin with references to
Windsor or Spyer: “Two women,” “Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer,” “Spyer,” “Windsor,” “She,” and “Windsor.” 70 Even
DOMA, the federal statute in question, is introduced in the context
of its implications for Edith Windsor—how this federal statute was
barring her from claiming the estate tax exemption.71 Similarly,
although the last two sentences of the first paragraph do not start
with the main characters as the subjects, their discussion of the
procedural posture of the case highlights the central narrative of
the two women.72
The procedural discussion of the case makes specific
references to Windsor and how the case impacts her personally.73
For instance, Justice Kennedy states, “the United States District
Court and the Court of Appeals ruled that this portion of the statute
is unconstitutional and ordered the United States to pay Windsor a
refund.”74 An alternative statement could have been that the courts
“ruled that this statute was unconstitutional and ordered a refund of
the taxes paid.” Similarly, the last sentence of the first paragraph
states, “this Court granted certiorari and now affirms the judgment
in Windsor’s favor”—again bringing Windsor into the equation
instead of simply stating “and now affirms.” 75 As a result,
“Windsor,” “Spyer,” or “she” (referring to Windsor) appears in

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 2697–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2682 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2689.
Id. at 2682–86, 2689.
Id. at 2682 (emphasis added).
Id.
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every sentence in the opening paragraph, showing the Court’s
conceptualization on a personal level. 76 Instead of impersonal
pronouns like “appellee” or “respondent,” the opinion consistently
refers to Windsor by name. In fact, “Windsor” appears 30 times in
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.77
This personal narrative allows the Court to engage in in-depth
discussions of the facts and issues presented in connection with
individual rights. The Court’s discussion of DOMA is an example.
The Court repeatedly links the impact of the statute to a right of an
individual, including the protagonist Windsor.78 It is true that the
discussion of DOMA also includes an examination of the
relationship between federal and state power.79 However, even in
that discussion of government power, the Court touches upon the
impact on the individual: “diminishing the stability and
predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it
proper to acknowledge and protect.”80 Thus, the issue of state and
federal power is not only explored in the abstract but also
discussed in the context of personal relations and the personal
harm that DOMA causes. By delving into interpersonal
relationships, the Court provides a thorough examination of how
individuals are affected. In fact, the majority opinion states that the
question presented is “one of immediate importance to the Federal
Government and to hundreds of thousands of persons.” 81 The
opinion goes on to state that “DOMA instructs all federal officials,
and indeed all persons with whom same-sex couples interact,
including their own children, that their marriage is less worthy than
the marriages of others.” 82 Again, the harm to individuals is
discussed extensively. This discussion goes beyond localized harm
that the government causes to individuals. It also explores the
indirect harm caused by other people’s perceptions and possible

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id.
Id. passim.
Id. at 2682–89.
Id. at 2694.
Id.
Id. at 2689 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2696.
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treatment of same-sex couples. Even if the reader is predisposed to
focus on governmental power or DOMA’s content, this discussion
on personal consequences allows the reader to refocus on the
personal consequences to the individuals involved.
This extensive rhetoric regarding individual rights is also
apparent in the introduction of third parties. For example, to
illuminate the harmful consequences of DOMA, Justice Kennedy
discusses the rights of children: “DOMA also brings financial
harm to children of same-sex couples.” 83 He comprehensively
describes DOMA’s harmful effects on children, thereby creating
vivid imagery of their victimization.84 For example, the opinion
states “it humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised
by same-sex couples. The law in question makes it even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness
of their own family . . . .” 85 In addition to financial harm to
children, the word “humiliates” introduces another dimension of
harm—the emotional consequences for children. This multidimensional description of harm assists the reader in clearly
identifying the victims—children of same-sex couples—and in
vividly imagining their suffering.
The Court’s use of children in its narrative goes into greater
depth than Windsor’s brief. The brief refers to children mostly to
discuss the connection between DOMA and procreation. 86 It
discusses how the Act is unrelated to encouraging procreation and
to “support for relationships that can result in mothers and fathers
jointly raising their biological children.”87 Only one sentence—
“DOMA deprives children with married gay parents of tangible
protections and stigmatizes their families by branding them
unequal”88—alludes to children’s victimhood.
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D. Persuasive Effect

The Supreme Court, in its discussion of rights, employs many
rhetorical techniques to convince the reader of its concept of an
individual right and, therefore, its decision. First, having a
protagonist drive the story of the opinion persuades the reader by
rendering him sympathetic to the character and the character’s
emotions. Vivid characters have often been tools for persuasion.
Studies have shown that “narratives influence beliefs and attitudes
in part by encouraging empathetic and emotional connections with
story characters.”89 When a person reads a legal opinion, he comes
with his own beliefs, rationales, and worldview. When the views of
the opinion are inconsistent with those of the reader, the reader
becomes resistant and may remain unconvinced even after
understanding and acknowledging the soundness of the court’s
reasoning. However, focusing on a character allows the reader to
distance himself from his preconceived notions and to be
transported to—and to become more invested in—the narrative of
the story presented. The character of the story, in other words,
invites and guides the reader into the world that the opinion
presents.
The theory of the transportation imagery model examines how
the reader gets “immersed in the world of the story” 90 and
distances himself from his own preexisting beliefs and opinions.91
In order to study the transportation imagery model, Philip
Mazzocco gave a short story of a homosexual to the participant
readers.92 The story involved a protagonist and a teenager who
recently came out as gay, in order “to produce tolerance and
acceptance of homosexuals.”93 The results of the study indicated
89
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that after reading the story, the persuasive narrative “influenced
transportable recipients by increasing empathy for homosexuals.”94
As the results show, the readers were affected by “cognitive
responses, beliefs, and attitude and intention changes” of the
narrative transportation. 95 This is consistent with the idea that
identifiable characters facilitate the “receiver’s identification with
and potential empathy for the characters” because the readers
“vicariously experience characters’ beliefs and emotions,
empathize with them, and become engrossed in the story.”96
This transportation contributes to the persuasiveness of the
Court’s holding for two reasons. First, the reader may identify with
the character and vicariously experience the pain that DOMA
brings to Windsor and homosexual couples. This identification
may facilitate acceptance of the Court’s holding that DOMA and
its definition of marriage are unfair and unconstitutional, just as the
identifiable character altered readers’ attitudes toward
homosexuality in the Mazzocco study. Second, the discussion of
the Act’s personal consequences may trigger an emotional
response to how the characters in the opinion suffer from the
denunciation of their marriage. Therefore, the reader may be more
sympathetic to same-sex couples and Edith Windsor’s claims after
conceptualizing DOMA as a medium of inflicting personal harm.
Second, the Court’s delineation of what is at stake in relation to
children also serves a persuasive function. Sympathy is important
in persuasion. To understand emotions and “to name them and
describe them, to know their causes and the way in which they are
excited” is one of “three means of effecting persuasion.”97 If the
reader is sympathetic to people whom DOMA negatively affects,
he will be more likely to agree with the Court’s decision to strike
down the statute. The discussion of children is a great mechanism
to arouse this sense of sympathy in readers.98 It creates vividly
94
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identifiable victims—a “determinant of sympathy”—because
“sympathy, like other emotions, is highly attuned to visual
imagery, and the more vivid that imagery is, the more likely one is
to sympathize.” 99 “[P]ortrayals of needy individuals who have
suffered misfortune for reasons beyond their control” is a prime
example of describing identifiable victims associated with
“sympathetic information.” 100 Similarly, researchers have found
that “moral emotions,” including sympathy, are “highly
intercorrelated and strongly related to perceived vulnerability.”101
Children—toddlers in particular—are the category of people who
are ranked highest on the vulnerability scale.102
Third, the Court in its narration of individual rights explores
the love story as a genre. Throughout the opinion, the love story
between Windsor and Spyer is developed extensively to fit the
“universal” factors of love to which the reader can relate. 103
Highlighting the universal features of love in Edith Windsor’s
relationship makes it easier for the reader to recognize that
Windsor and Spyer loved each other just as a heterosexual couple
loves each other. This emphasis on the universal nature of love is
particularly important because many fictional narratives on love
have described love as “timeless and natural” and part of “human
nature.”104
The idea of commitment is important because of the notion that
love is about “emotional commitment, empathy, and exclusivity so
strong that lovers are … prepared to . . . continue their relationship

112, 118 (2007) (discussing the plight of 18-month-old “Baby Jessica”).
99
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beyond death.” 105 The Court’s description of the love between
Windsor and Spyer resonates with this universal description of
love based on emotional commitment. For instance, the Court
highlights how they were involved in a “long term relationship,”106
highlighting the lasting element of their commitment. The intensity
of emotional dedication to one another is underscored by the
Court’s description of how Spyer “left her entire estate to
Windsor,” 107 and their continued efforts to affirm their
commitment through marriage. First, they tried “waiting some
years” for the legalization of gay marriage,108 but when “citizens
had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the
same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that
of a man and woman in lawful marriage,” they traveled to Ontario
to get married.109 This framing of Windsor’s love as the love that
all readers experience was evident when the Court stated that they
“affirm[ed] their commitment to one another before their children,
their family, their friends, and their community.”110 The repetition
of “their children, their family, their friends, and their community”
places same-sex couples in the same position as any other
individuals with their own family members, loved ones, and
communities. The readers, therefore, can identify with the love and
desire for commitment. Like heterosexual couples, Windsor and
Spyer and other same-sex couples love each other and want to
show it through commitment.
In addition, emphasizing Windsor’s love makes it easier for the
reader to accept the holding because love is frequently associated
with marriage. While in the past love and marriage were not
necessarily correlated, the notion of romantic marriage has gained
great prominence in modern society.111 For instance “[i]n Western
cultures, love is important because it is strongly associated with
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marriage” 112 and people frequently view love as an essential
component of marriage or marriage as a result of love.113 As a
consequence, the connection between love and marriage114 seems
natural to the reader. The reader relates Windsor’s and Speyer’s
love to his or her own and thus is more likely to accept the Court’s
decision.
Further, Windsor’s love story is tragic. Death dramatized the
love between Windsor and Spyer. The journey to their marriage
began because they were “concerned about Spyer’s health.” 115
Even when one partner had fallen ill and was suffering, the couple
still “longed to marry,”116 and Windsor stood by Spyer’s side until
Spyer’s death.117 This death invokes the genre of the tragic love
story. Tragedy has historically been a source of emotional
involvement for the reader. From Homer’s Iliad to Sophocles’
King Oedipus, readers become personally involved in “narratives”
that “help members of an audience understand the problematic in
social life and integrate understandings with existing models of
self and other.” 118 This theme is common in tragedy—that of
humans living “in a world in which they choose many of their own
actions,” where “their mental models are usually imperfect and
invariably incomplete” and where “their agency is limited by the
constraints of embodiment.”119 Windsor’s and Spyer’s suffering
due to an event beyond their control triggers the same sort of
“personal involvement” that the classic tragedies bring to the
reader and make him “once again moved” with “tears in [his]
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eyes.” 120 Furthermore, the intensity of personal involvement
through emotional experience is critical to persuasion because
these sorts of emotions “signal situations that are personally
important” to readers and beyond their rational understanding.121
Readers—triggered by memories, emotions, and reactions—invest
a part of themselves in the tragic love story between Windsor and
Spyer. Exploring the love story as a genre enables not only a
discussion of the legal issue presented in relation to individual
right—the right to marry—but also makes the discussion more
convincing.
IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL NARRATIVE OF SHELBY COUNTY
In the previous section, this Article discussed how the Supreme
Court conducted an extensive discourse on an individual right in
Windsor and the way in which the Court advanced the rights of
same-sex couples. As also discussed, commentators have criticized
Shelby County as retreat in racial equality. This Article does not
dispute the notion that Shelby County invalidated a crucial portion
of the Voting Rights Act—an action that can be described as
adversarial to an individual right. Nevertheless, a close
examination of the opinion’s language reveals a heavy discussion
and framing based on the notion of a right, just as in Windsor,
albeit on a different level. The Court engaged in a persuasive
narration of an individual right in Windsor, and a persuasive
narration of an institutional right in Shelby County.
A. Introduction to Shelby County v. Holder
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court held that
Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional because
current political conditions rendered its coverage formula
obsolete. 122 Shelby County sought a declaratory judgment that
Sections 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were facially
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unconstitutional.123 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
enacted to address racial discrimination in voting, required States
to “obtain federal permission before enacting any law related to
voting”124 and Section 4 of the Act applied that requirement “only
to some States” covered by the formula it provided.125 While the
Supreme Court did not speak to Section 5, the Court declared that
Section 4 of the Act was no longer constitutional.126
B. Possibility of Alternate Framing
Similar to Windsor, Shelby County could have also been
framed in the context of a personal or institutional narrative. On
the one hand, the story was institutional because a county, and not
an individual, brought the suit. On the other hand, the case
complicates the individual rights of minority voters and their
struggles for equal voting rights.
The parties presented the Court with these alternative framings.
Shelby County focused its brief on an institutional narrative.127 In
the introduction to its petition for certiorari, Shelby County began
with the notion of state power: “Article IV and the Tenth
Amendment reserve to the States the power to regulate
elections.” 128 The beginning of the petition describes the main
character of the story—the state—and the theme of state power.
Also, when discussing the contemporary evidence of
discrimination, the County presented evidence on an abstract level
—for example, its discussion of the objection rate,129 voter turnout
and registration rates,130 a state-by-state comparison of Section 2
litigation data,131 and “instances of racially polarized voting.”132
123
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In contrast, there are also examples of personal narratives. The
respondent-intervenors Bobby Pierson et al. began Section A of
their petition with, “[a]fter ‘enduring nearly a century of systematic
resistance to the Fifth Amendment,’ Congress enacted the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, [Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965)], ‘to
banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has
infected the electoral process in parts of our country.’”133 Then the
second sentence immediately frames on an individual level what is
at stake by stating that “[f]or nearly fifty years, the Voting Rights
Act has played a pivotal role in helping to preserve the right to
vote for all Americans.” 134 Also, the brief for the federal
respondent to the Supreme Court uses a personal narrative to
present evidence of current discrimination. It introduces the
individual “voter” as the subject. 135 It then discusses how the
States “discriminated against African-American voters” 136 and
“resist[ed] minority voters’ equal enjoyment of the right to
participate in the political process.”137 The amicus brief for the
New York Law School Racial Justice Project states that the Voting
Rights Act’s success “was a turning point in ‘the struggle to end
discriminatory treatment of minorities who seek to exercise one of
the most fundamental rights of our citizens: the right to vote.’”138
The discussions focused on rights at an individual level, articulated
the implications of Section 4 for African Americans, and situated
the Act in relation to the history of intentional discrimination
against African American voters. The Court, likewise, could have
132
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explained that voters of some states are granted a different level of
protection than voters of other states because those states have to
receive preclearance from the federal government. To further
illustrate the difference between a personal and an institutional
narrative, an alternative opening to the opinion could have
discussed examples of “extraordinary problems,” such as African
Americans being unable to vote because they were blocked at the
ballots. This alternative narrative focusing on minority voters and
their struggle to gain their constitutionally guaranteed right to vote
would have triggered sympathy toward them. They are identifiable
victims who are suffering because of invidious discriminatory
policies that state actors have undertaken to suppress their voting
strength. Highlighting this story of personal struggle would also
have facilitated transportation of the reader into the story of the
struggling voters.
The Court could have framed the narrative in different ways. It
could have created an institutional narrative that focused on state
and national data, or a personal narrative that focused on minority
voters and their struggles. The following sections demonstrate that
the Court chose an institutional narrative in a strategic way to
increase persuasiveness of the outcome of Shelby County. While a
personal narrative, as the Court used in Windsor, focuses on
triggering an emotional or psychological reaction to the personal
character and Windsor’s story, an institutional narrative detaches
personal emotion or connection, and redirects the focus to the
institution (in this case, the state) and its traditions and principles.
But, similar to Windsor, the Court in Shelby County—with the unit
as a state—employs persuasive rhetoric based on the concept of a
right.
C. Rhetoric on Right: State Right
Just as Windsor framed a protagonist in its story, Shelby
County creates a protagonist of the “state” to begin its discussion
of the right at issue. The majority opinion begins by stating that
“[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary
measures to address an extraordinary problem”139 and focuses on
139
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the statute. The Court, when discussing the implications of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act in relation to the states, notes that
“Section 5 of the Act required States to obtain federal permission
before enacting any law related to voting—a drastic departure from
basic principles of federalism.”140 The Court further recognized
that “§ 4 of the Act applied that requirement only to some
States . . . .” 141 Throughout the opinion, the words “state” and
“states” appear sixty-nine times, while the words “voter” and
“voters” appear twenty-eight times (only when used as nouns or
adjectives).142
With the “state” as the protagonist, the Court engages in the
discussion of the right, similar to its engagement in the discussion
of right with Edith Windsor as the protagonist in Windsor. The
Supreme Court engages in a discussion of institutional rights,
namely, the right to maintain its sovereignty under federalism, just
as a person has a right to maintain his autonomy as a person. The
majority opinion starts with the introduction of “basic principles of
federalism” 143 and returns to this idea of a “fundamental
principle” 144 of federalism throughout the opinion. Then, it
references these “basic features of our system of government”
when discussing how the Voting Rights Act is a drastic departure
from this institutional feature.145 In fact, the features of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 are repeatedly characterized as “extraordinary
measures” or “drastic departures.” 146 Chief Justice Roberts’
majority opinion describes the Act as “strong medicine,”147 and
recounts the “exceptional conditions” 148 that led to the
“unprecedented nature of these measures,” 149 which “sharply
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departed” 150 from the basic principles of federalism. 151 The
emphasis on the “extraordinary” and “drastic” nature of the Voting
Rights Act in conjunction with the description of an “institutional
feature” that is “fundamental” highlights the Voting Rights Act
pre-clearance requirement as an exception to the norms of
federalism. Phrases such as “substantial federalism costs”152 and
“extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our federal
system”153 are additional examples of how the Court underscores
the principle of federalism and the maintenance of institutional
integrity. The Court’s statement that “[s]tates retain broad
autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative
objectives”154 is another example of an emphasis on sovereignty
under the principle of federalism.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court engages in rhetoric of
institutional rights based on equality among the states. The
majority opinion declares that the nation was founded as a “union
of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority.” 155 However,
according to the Court, §4 of the Act violated the fundamental
rights of the states in an extraordinary way.156 Just as Windsor
highlighted a violation of a right in relation to DOMA, the Court
discusses the Voting Rights Act in relation to a violation of a state
right: “While one State waits months or years and expends funds to
implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can typically put the
same law into effect immediately, through the normal legislative
process.”157 The Court even frames the question in relation to a
150
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state’s right to equal treatment, saying that “[t]he question is
whether the Act’s extraordinary measures, including its disparate
treatment of the States, continue to satisfy constitutional
requirements.”158 The discussion of equality continues as the Court
recognizes that a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
requires showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is
sufficiently related to the problem that it targets. These basic
principles guide our review of the question before us.” 159 The
Court repeatedly refers to equal sovereignty among the states as a
“fundamental principle,” highlighting its rhetoric on the federalist
institutional structure and its core implications on a state’s right to
sovereignty.160 It further states “Over a hundred years ago, this
Court explained that our Nation ‘was and is a union of States,
equal in power, dignity and authority.’”161 The phrase, “[o]ver a
hundred years ago,” is used to assert that this principle of equal
sovereignty among the states has been elaborated for a long period.
The opinion also makes a reference to the “tradition of equal
sovereignty,”162 strengthening its position by highlighting states’
long-standing right to sovereignty.
D. Persuasive Effect
As in Windsor, the Court’s rhetoric on rights gains
persuasiveness through various rhetorical devices. First, as
discussed above, the Court aligns attachment and transportation
from voters to the character of the state.
Second, the Court’s reference to federalism enhances the
legitimacy of its decision. Scholars such as Robert Hume have
observed the Court’s use of esteemed rhetorical sources to enhance
its persuasiveness.163 Hume stated that “when deciding hard cases,
justices must know that their opinions are likely to be scrutinized
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by individuals both on and off the bench.”164 Hume further argues
that the Court’s usage of esteemed sources like the Federalist
Papers enhances the “legitimacy of [its] decisions” because the
Justices can associate their rulings with the legitimacy of the
sources that they cite.165 The Justices can enhance their legitimacy
through the “use of persuasive opinion content, including
rhetorical sources” and by “associating their rulings with the views
of well-respected authorities.”166 Hume has found that the “Justices
do indeed cite rhetorical sources with greater frequency when the
legitimacy of their decisions is lowest.”167
Just as the Justices can enhance the legitimacy of their
decisions through the use of esteemed sources, they can improve
their persuasiveness by associating their decisions with other
factors that enhance legitimacy, such as tradition. Max Weber has
argued that there are three sets of authority: legal authority,
traditional authority, and charismatic authority.168 In discussing the
traditional authority of federalism, Weber acknowledges the
possibility of history establishing legitimacy, “if legitimacy is
claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the
order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed
down from the past, ‘have always existed.’”169 Just as a person,
such as a monarch, can gain legitimacy and authority through the
notion of tradition, an institutional principle, such as federalism,
can gain legitimacy through its durability. 170 This method is
especially efficient because federalism is one of the most important
institutional structures of the United States,171 and the idea of each
164
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state enjoying its sovereignty under the umbrella of the federal
government is one of the unique features of the country’s
institutional structure.172
This emphasis on the principle of federalism is consistent with
the Shelby County’s Supreme Court brief. The brief uses language
such as “federalism burden,” 173 “federalism costs,” 174 “severe
federalism problems,” 175 the “fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty,” 176 and the “constitutional principle of equal
sovereignty.” 177 On the other hand, the brief for the federal
respondent does not contain any mention of federalism and
discusses state sovereignty only once, when it states that it is not
an invasion of state sovereignty when Congress is legitimately
enforcing restrictions.178 Instead, the brief emphasizes fundamental
rights such as the right to equal treatment and the right to vote.179
Briefs for the respondent-intervenors Earl Cunningham et al. also
mention the idea of “federalism costs” only twice180 and discuss
describing the institutional structure of the United States. Federalism also is a
key ingredient in Our Nationalism. The modern federal regulatory apparatus is
increasingly attendant to questions of the state-federal allocation of
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instead the “right to vote on account of race,”181 the exercise of the
right to vote, 182 and the “fundamental . . . right to vote.” 183
Ignoring the federalism arguments supports the position that
federalism is inessential to the Court’s decision. The Court,
however, uses federalism as a rhetorical tool to strategically frame
the case. And just as the plaintiff highlighted the principle of
federalism to persuade the Court, the Court invokes this federalist
principle to enhance the opinion’s legitimacy.
Third, the Court discusses data in a persuasive way in its
narration of the impact on states. This is especially so when it
acknowledges racial discrimination in the past and contrasts it with
current state-level empirical data to support its position.
Concession is a rhetorical device that enhances the legitimacy and
persuasiveness of the speaker by establishing him as a good
character. Imagine two people. One is denying a set of facts that is
clearly established by evidence, and blindly refuting a common
history that almost every reader agrees has happened. Another
admits to commonly agreed-upon facts presented by the other side.
As an example of concession, Aristotle states “the litigant will
sometimes not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done
harm. But that he is guilty of injustice he will never admit” and
“political orators often make any concession short of admitting that
they are recommending their hearers to take an inexpedient course
or not to take an expedient one.”184 This usage of concession is an
effective means of persuasion because the speakers “have at their
command propositions about the possible and the impossible, and
about whether a thing has or has not occurred, will or will not
occur.”185 Aristotle states that there are three modes of persuasion:
the “personal character of the speaker,” “putting the audience into
a certain frame of mind,” and “proof, or apparent proof, provided
by the words of the speech itself.”186 Conceding an issue may
signal to the reader that the speaker is a rational, reasonable, and
181
182
183
184
185
186
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open-minded person, and is thus credible. Strategic concession,
therefore, may improve the persuasiveness of the speaker by
signaling to the audience that the speaker is of a good personal
character.187
When discussing past discrimination, the Court—breaking
from its practice in other parts of the opinion—employs a personal
narrative that is similar to the defendants’ narrative framework.
Since the Court’s opinion displays this shift in the narrative toward
that of the losing side, this Article refers to the Court’s recognition
and discussion of past discrimination as a form of concession.
The majority opinion switches its narrative from personal to
institutional when discussing evidence of past discrimination and
current discrimination for the purposes of evaluating the validity of
the Section 4 formula.188 The Court, like the federal respondent,
uses personal narrative when describing evidence of past
discrimination.189 In the beginning of Section IA, the opinion gives
historical evidence of racial discrimination in voting. 190 When
discussing the past, the Court introduces a personal character,
namely, an African American voter, with phrases like “other
methods designed to prevent African-Americans from voting.”191
Also, in describing past discrimination, the Court states, “only 19.4
percent of African-Americans of voting age were registered to vote
in Alabama, only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent
in Mississippi.” 192 This narrative acknowledges and highlights
personal harm to “African-Americans.” Even when discussing
more abstract evidence, such as voting rights, in the historical
context, the Court provides a link to this personal character: “a low
voting rate is pertinent for the obvious reason that widespread
disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of actual
voters.”193 Further, the Court states how past racial discrimination

187

See EDWARD P. J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL
RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT (4th ed. 1998).
188
Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619 (2013).
189
See id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 2624.
193
Id. at 2625 (emphasis added).

538

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

“denied African-Americans the most basic freedoms,” which
establishes a narrative based on African Americans, as people,
being denied the freedom to vote.194
A case like Shelby County presents multiple issues. Most
people agree that there has been serious historical racial
discrimination in voting rights and that legislation like the Voting
Rights Act was necessary to redress for minority voters that
violation of equal protection. The Court therefore wisely
acknowledged that there had been racial discrimination in the past
that made the implementation of the Voting Rights Act imperative.
By using a personal narrative similar to that used by Shelby County
and discussing the evidence of past racial discrimination in a
sympathetic light, the Court conceded the past justification for the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act, including Section 4.
Expressing its agreement allows the Court to signal to the reader
that it is reasonably accepting the position of the party it ruled
against. Therefore, the Court can be seen as a reasonable, fair, and
unbiased arbiter. By accepting the necessity of the Voting Rights
Act in the past and the grave personal consequences of
discrimination against minority voters, the Court was able to ease
the reader into its discussion of the current conditions and the
invalidity of Section 4 of the Act.
When the Court discusses recent evidence, however, the
framing shifts to again detach the emotional aspect associated with
a personal narrative and instead focuses on state-level data. The
Court points out that African Americans occupy a greater portion
of political offices than in the past,195 and primarily frames the
evidence on a state level, discussing “voter turnout and registration
rates,” and “blatant discriminatory evasions of federal decrees.”196
Again, an alternative would have been to present African
American voters on a personal level, thus paralleling sentence
structure with the discussion of past discrimination. Similarly,
although the Court references the House Report that discusses the
consequences for individuals, such as “the number of AfricanAmericans who are registered and who turn out to cast ballots has
194
195
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increased significantly over the last 40 years, particularly since
1982” or “significant increases in the number of AfricanAmericans serving in elected offices,”197 it does so by referring to
data on a state level, using phrases like “voter turnout.”198 In fact,
the Court does not address the number of white and African
American voters from the Census Bureau statistics but jumps
straight to an analysis of the rates and statistics on “disparities in
voter registration and turnout due to race.”199
This is in contrast to the New York Law School Racial Justice
Project amicus brief, which puts minority voters at the center of the
discussion and states that “minority citizens are still denied access
to the ballot and have had to struggle through increasingly
ingenious discriminatory roadblocks.” 200 The amicus brief also
includes specific personal examples, including how David Dinkins,
an African American, encountered “blatant attempts of
intimidation” during his reelection campaign for mayor of New
York.201 As this alternative approach shows, the Court, if it wanted
to continue its personal narrative, could have pointed to a story
about an African American voter no longer facing challenges in
registering to vote in Shelby County.
As demonstrated above, the Court, as in Windsor, engaged in
strategic narration of the right in Shelby County to further its
conceptualization of the right, and to persuade the reader of its
holding.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the Supreme Court’s rhetorical framings
helps the reader to understand the otherwise contradictory opinions
of Windsor and Shelby County. These landmark decisions have
spurred criticism of the Court’s inconsistent treatment of equality.
This Article supplements the comparative study of the two cases
by analyzing another dimension: their narrations. The rhetorical
197
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200
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analysis of the two cases shows that the Court approached Windsor
using a personal narrative and Shelby County using an institutional
narrative. This rhetorical analysis, focusing on how the cases were
decided, reveals that the Court’s decisions may be more
harmonious than critics have acknowledged. It suggests that the
Court conceptualized both cases in relation to the concept of
“rights,” albeit rights on different levels. Also, the Court in both
cases engaged in strategic narration regarding its selected concepts
of rights and employed various rhetorical devices to make its
decisions more persuasive. This dimension, which focuses on the
Court’s rhetoric as opposed to mere outcomes, may be a new
medium for understanding this critical time for equality.

